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CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION IN OHIO-
IMPLEMENTING THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT
"A child who has never been given the chance to develop a sense of be-
longing and whose personal attachments when beginning to form are cruelly
disrupted, may well be crippled for life, to his (her) own lasting detriment
and the detriment of society."'
CMLD CUSTODY LAWS in America have enabled child snatching and other
methods of self help to be effective means of obtaining possession, and
even legal custody of children.! The highly publicized Mellon child snatching
case exemplifies self help methods used by both a custodial and noncus-
todial parent to gain physical custody of their children. After a 1974 divorce
decree which awarded custody to the father, wealthy industrialist Seward
Prosser Mellon, the wife, Karen Leigh Boyd, took the children out of Penn-
sylvania to New York. There she obtained a legal custody decree in her
favor. Within a year, the father, through his agents, had the children
snatched while they were walking to school and had them returned to him
in Pennsylvania.' Because of the legal custody decrees and existing laws,
the New York prosecutor had no grounds upon which to prosecute Mellon.'
Another poignant example of the problems surrounding self help
custody remedies involved the snatching of two children from their front
yard by their mother. Under a Colorado custody decree, the children's
father was granted custody. Using self help, the mother took the children
from their Colorado home to Virginia. The father then took his Colorado
custody decree to Virginia to obtain physical custody of his children. How-
ever, the father was told by the court, "we're in Virginia now." Conse-
quently, the Colorado decree was disregarded and the mother granted
custody.5
In an effort to end self help alternatives and to create consistency in
state custody laws, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
I UNORM CMn CUSTODY JURISDICTON ACT, Prefatory Note. See NATIONAL COmNNCE
OF COMMISSONERS ON STATE LAWS HANDBOOK 194 (1968). The Uniform Act as enacted
by the Ohio Legislature will be referred to as Omo Rnv. CoDE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.27
(Page Supp. 1977).
2Child Snatching, NEwswEnx, October 18, 1976, at 24. "Child snatching" is defined as
"divorced or separated parents who kidnap their own children during or after custody fights."
3 See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1976, at 1, coL 7.
4 See NEwswEE, October 18, 1976, at 24-25.
S The Child-Stealing Epidemic, NATIoN, May 7, 1977, at 559.
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State Laws in 1968 adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(U.C.C.J.A.).' The Ohio legislature" has recently joined a growing number
of states8 by enacting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
In light of public concern over child snatching, the uncertainty of the
recognition and enforcement of custody decrees by sister states,9 and recom-
mendations of legal scholars,'" the Commissioners drafted the U.C.C.J.A.
The stated purposes of the Act include establishing greater stability in the
home environment by enacting laws which deter child snatching and forum
shopping, reducing conflicts and competition between state courts over
jurisdiction, and promoting enforcement of child custody decrees. The Act
has adopted standards to be used by the courts to avoid jurisdictional con-
flicts and to determine when a court should exercise jurisdiction." The
6 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT.
T OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.21-.27 (Page Supp. 1977). Originally S.B. 135, the Ohio
Legislature passed the bill "to amend § 2111.06, 2151.23, and 3109.7 of the Revised Code
to adopt a uniform child custody jurisdiction act." The bill became effective October 30,
1977.
sTo date twenty states have enacted the UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT:
ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.010-.910 (1977); CAL. CIV. CODE H9 5150-74 (West Supp. 1977);
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, H9 1901-25
(Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. H9 61.1302-.1348 (West 1977); HAw. REV. STAT. H§ 583-1
to -26 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 5-1001 to -1025 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE H9 31-1-11.6-1
to .6-24 (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. H§ 598A.1 -.25 (West Supp. 1977-78); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, H9 184-207 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.651-.673 (MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.651-.673 (Callaghan Supp. 1976)); 1977 MINN. STAT. ANN. H9 518A.01-
518.155 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 9H 61.104-.122 (Supp. 1977); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-A to -Z (McKinney's Supp. 1977-78); N.D. CENT. CODE H9 14-14-01
to -26 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.21-.27 (Page Supp. 1977); 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2401-21 (West Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. H9 822.01-.25 (West 1977); Wyo. STAT.
H9 20-143 to -167 (Cum. Supp. 1976). It is expected that several more states will enact the
U.C.CJ.A. in 1978.
9 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Prefatory Note. See Moving to Stop Child
Snatching, TimE, February 27, 1978, at 85, which estimates 25,000 to 100,000 child snatch-
ing cases per year.
10 See Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extra-Litigious
Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1965); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate
Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Cumie on a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S.
CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV.
795 (1964).
11 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURIsDICTION ACT. § I Purposes of Act:
(1) To avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in shifting of children from
state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) To promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody
decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of
the child;
(3) To assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training and personal
relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the
[V/ol. 12:1
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Commissioners commented that "each section of the Act should be read
and applied with these purposes in mind."12
Reflecting upon the drafters' purposes, this comment will discuss the
judicial and legislative ambiguity in Ohio which necessitated legislative
change. It will also compare Ohio's child custody litigation prior to the
enactment of the U.C.C.J.A. with the results that are likely to be obtained
in today's child custody litigation. In addition, it will examine the statutory
procedures which now govern child custody litigation and areas of concern
which remain to be challenged.
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOGNITION OF CUSTODY DECREES
One of the compelling reasons for interstate custody disputes and child
snatching has been the ease of finding an out-of-state court that would
either refuse to give effect to the original decree or would freely modify it.
Parents have successfully engaged in forum shopping to obtain custody
decrees which are not always in the best interests of the child." The
U.C.C.J.A. has statutory provisions which provide guidelines to be used in
such cases to prevent abuses.1 " This section will first discuss the problems
related to enforcement and recognition of interstate custody decrees and
then analyze the U.C.C.J.A. sections which expressly deal with these issues.
When a parent or party with interest in the child has illegally obtained
physical custody, the most widely used remedy by the custodial parent or
exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection
with another state;
(4) To discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater
stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) To deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain
custody awards;
(6) To avoid reitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as
feasible;
(7) To facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) To promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with
the same child; and
(9) To make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
12 UNIFORM CILD CUSTODY JURISDIcnoN Acr, § 1 Comment.
Is The "best interests of the child" has been the standard used to determine the appropriate
party to receive custody. OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1977). See note
113 infra; McVay v. McVay, 44 Ohio App. 2d 370, 338 N.E.2d 772 (1975), which holds
that in determining the best interests of the child both parents are equal and preference
should not be given to the mother as used to be applied under the Tender Years Doctrine.
See also Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1396 (1965), which makes children's wishes a factor; Orno
Civ. R. 75(D) which provides that a child over twelve years can decide which parent he/she
prefers; Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963), mentioning "split" or "divided" custody of children.
Today custody, in the proper circumstances, may be split equally between parents.
14 OHno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.24, 3109.26, 3109.30-.32 (Page Supp. 1977).
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one claiming a right, is the writ of habeas corpus. Even under the U.C.CJ.A.
this is still the proper action to test the right of custody. In Ohio "[w]hoever
is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, or entitled to the custody of another,
of which custody such person is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute a writ
of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment, restraint,
or deprivation."' 5 Habeas corpus is the proper procedure to be used by parents
to test the illegal restraint or right to immediate custody of children who
are under the jurisdiction of an in-state or out-of-state court. 6
The juvenile courts in Ohio have been granted by statute exclusive
original jurisdiction "to hear and determine any application for writ of
habeas corpus involving the custody of children."' 7 Another conflicting
statute confers authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus on "the supreme
court, court of appeals, court of common pleas, probate court or by a judge
of any such court."'" The issue of whether writs of habeas corpus must be
filed and heard under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court
or whether one has the opportunity to forum shop has recently been deter-
mined by the Ohio Supreme Court.
In In rd Black,"9 a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in an
Ohio court of appeals by the mother, an Idaho resident, pursuant to an
Idaho custody decree granting her permanent custody. The father had taken
the children from Idaho to Ohio where they were then residing. The Ohio
Supreme Court was asked to determine the issue of jurisdiction of the court
of appeals to hear a writ of habeas corpus in light of the exclusive original
jurisdiction statutorily granted to the juvenile court.2" The supreme court
held that the court of appeals had been granted jurisdiction over writs of
habeas corpus by the Ohio Constitution."' In conflicts between constitutional
and statutory grants of jurisdiction, constitutional grants prevail.2 Thus, the
court held that the juvenile court's jurisdiction was exclusive and original
only between those courts with statutory grants of jurisdiction, i.e., courts
of common pleas or probate courts, and not over other courts with con-
stitutional grants of authority."
15 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2725.01 (Page 1954).
261n re Messner, 19 Ohio App. 2d 33, 249 N.E.2d 532 (1969).
27 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1977).
is OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2725.02 (Page 1954).
29 36 Ohio St. 2d 124, 304 N.E.2d 394 (1973).
20 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1977).
21 OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 3(B) (1). The court of appeals shall have original jurisdiction in
the following types of actions: quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition and pro-
cedendo.
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The Ohio Supreme Court was recently called upon again to determine
a conflict of jurisdiction between the court of appeals and the juvenile court
in Hughes v. Scaffide. " A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the
court of appeals asserting that a minor daughter was being unlawfully re-
strained of her liberty. The court of appeals denied the writ under the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens stating that the juvenile court was the
appropriate forum to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in cases involving
child custody." The Ohio Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
could not deny the writ of habeas corpus under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and that the constitutionally granted original jurisdiction"0 must
be exercised by the court of appeals. 7
The use of habeas corpus to award temporary or permanent custody
or to modify custody decrees has been disputed, and the courts remain split
on its applicability. The United States Supreme Court in May v. Anderson,"8
applying Ohio law, held that a writ of habeas corpus could be used to de-
termine one's immediate right to physical custody. However, it could not
be used to either modify a prior award of custody, even under a showing of
changed circumstances, or to settle future custody disputes. This view was
also expressed in Bloom v. Wilde"' whereby the Ohio court held that upon
the filing of a writ of habeas corpus, the court would not interfere with an
out-of-state decree.
A minority of Ohio courts have held that once a court obtains jurisdiction
under a writ of habeas corpus, it can determine future child custody."0 One
example is the early Ohio case, Weiss v. Fite,"' in which the court of appeals
followed authorities of other states and held that an Ohio court can deter-
mine future custody in a habeas corpus action rather than be limited to the
enforcement of the original custody decree where the welfare and the best
interests of the children thus demand.
The writ of habeas corpus is still a viable alternative when one asserting
custody is seeking to gain physical control over children who are being
illegally restrained. The U.C.C.J.A. provides the courts with guidelines to be
24 53 Ohio St. 2d 85, 372 N.E.2d 598 (1978).
25 ld. at 86, 372 N.E.2d at 600.
2e See note 21 supra.
27 53 Ohio St. 2d at 90, 372 N.E.2d at 602.
28345 U.S. 528 (1953). See In re Corey, 145 Ohio St. 413, 61 N.E.2d 892 (1945).
29 42 Ohio Op. 404, 94 N.E.2d 656 (1950).
80 Weiss v. Fite, 19 Ohio App. 309 (1924). But see note 138 infra which followed Weiss
in applying the best interest standard in determining whether to return a child who is a
ward of a foreign jurisdiction. See also Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
81 19 Ohio App. at 317.
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used in determining one's right to custody, but in order to invoke the court's
jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus is still appropriate.
Another aspect of the enforcement question concerns the issue of full
faith and credit. Article IV section 1 of the United States Constitution states
that full faith and credit should be given by the state to judicial proceedings of
a sister state. 2 As a general rule, state courts have not accorded full faith
and credit to custody decrees rendered by sister states. The lack of finality
of a custody order, in light of the fact that changed circumstances may
provide grounds for modifications, has been argued as a ground not to apply
the constitutional requirements of full faith and credit to child custody de-
crees. Thus, forum shopping and child snatching have accomplished parents'
goals in finding a sympathetic court to award custody in their favor.
The United States Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
determine the issue of whether custody decrees should be accorded full faith
and credit.3" In a highly criticized opinion, May v. Anderson, " the Supreme
Court held that the Ohio court was not bound by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to give effect to a Wisconsin custody decree obtained by the father
in an ex parte hearing. Since the Wisconsin court did not obtain personal
jurisdiction over the mother, the Ohio courts were free to make their own
custody determination. The court declined to indicate how they would
have answered the full faith and credit issue if the Wisconsin court had
obtained personal jurisdiction over the mother.
In a strong dissent, Justice Jackson criticized the majority holding and
the court's interpretation which "seem[ed] to reduce the law of custody to
a rule of seize-and-run." Justice Jackson refused to hold, as the majority
did, that a state where a parent and child are domiciled "cannot constitu-
32 U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1, states: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof." The statute passed under this authority is found at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
3See Kovacs v. Kovacs, 356 U.S. 604 (1957); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947)
(where the Supreme Court expressly left the issue undecided).
84 345 U.S. 528 (1953). In this case the parties were married and domiciled in Wisconsin
until 1947, when after marital problems the wife moved to Columbiana County, Ohio,
to think about the problems. She decided not to return. The husband then filed for divorce and
custody in Wisconsin. A copy of the Wisconsin summons and petition were delivered to
the wife. She did not appear in Wisconsin and custody was awarded to the father. The
father came to Ohio with the decree and took the children back to Wisconsin. During a
visit, the mother took the children back to Ohio. The father filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the Ohio probate court, which held in favor of the father as did the court of appeals and
the Ohio Supreme Court,
15 d. at 542,
[VOL 12:1
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tionally adjudicate controversies as to his guardianship""6 when the other
parent leaves the state: "A state of the law such as this, where possession
apparently is not merely nine points of the law but all of them and self-help
the ultimate authority, has little to commend it in legal logic or as a
principle of order in a federal system.""7
In Ford v. Ford,8 the United States Supreme Court again refused to
hold the Full Faith and Credit Clause applicable to a child custody case.
Limiting its decision to the facts of the case, the Court held that the South
Carolina court was not bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause since the
Virginia decree dismissing a writ of habeas corpus is not res judicata. 9
The Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in the case of
Borri v. Silverson,10 which involved the Full Faith and Credit Clause's ap-
plicability to a child custody decree. Although this would have been a timely
opportunity to determine the full faith and credit issue, the Court denied
the writ as improvidently granted.
The Ohio Supreme Court in keeping with the United States Supreme
Court has held that Ohio does not have to accord full faith and credit to
an out-of-state custody decree if the decree was made when the parent who
originally was granted custody was properly domiciled in Ohio with the
children." The court's most "controlling consideration is the welfare of the
child" " and the Ohio court is "free to determine whether it is for the wel-
fare and best interest of the children to give full faith and credit"'" to the
out-of-state order. In a more recent case, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that if another jurisdiction has awarded child custody pursuant to a valid
in personam order and there are no changes in circumstances affecting the
8e Id. at 539.
8T Id.
38371 U.S. 187 (1962). Here, the Virginia court dismissed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus after the parents made an agreement concerning the custody of the children. In
later action by the mother for custody in South Carolina, the court held that it must give
full faith and credit to the Virginia decree and agreement made pursuant to it.
29 Id. at 194.
40429 U.S. 1078 (1977).
," Cunningham v. Cunningham, 166 Ohio St. 203, 141 N.E.2d 172 (1951); Purcell v. Purcell,
47 Ohio App. 2d 258, 353 N.E.2d 882 (1975). The fact patterns of these cases are similar.
The parents were divorced out-of-state and the mother was granted custody. The mother
moved to Ohio with the children and while domiciled in Ohio, the father in the original
jurisdiction sought and obtained modification granting him custody. The Ohio courts were
faced with the issue of whether they were required to give full faith and credit to the out-
of-state decrees as modified. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971).
42 166 Ohio St. at 205, 141 N.E.2d at 173.
43 47 Ohio App. 2d at 259, 253 N.E.2d at 883.
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child's best interests, the Ohio court will award full faith and credit to the
out-of-state decree."
The U.C.C.J.A. offers remedies to the full faith and credit conflict. The
Act provides that a state court proceeding which is in compliance with the
prerequisites to jurisdiction 5 and in which notice and opportunity to be
heard have been given" will be binding on the parties."' As to these parties,
the decree is "conclusive as to all issues of law or fact decided and as to
the custody determination made, unless and until that determination is modi-
fied pursuant to law."' This section takes into consideration the issue of
finality of a custody decree and determines that a decree will be considered
final until modified.
The statute also mandates that a court of Ohio "shall recognize and
enforce an initial or modification decree of another state if that court
assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions. . . ."I' By enacting the
U.C.C.J.A., Ohio will give full faith and credit to custody decrees of
sister states made in compliance with jurisdictional and due process require-
ments. As noted by the Commissioners, "recognition and enforcement is
mandatory if the state in which the prior decree was rendered (1) has adopted
this Act, (2) has statutory jurisdictional requirements substantially like this
Act, or (3) would have jurisdiction under the facts of the case if this Act
had been law in the state."50
The Act also enables one to bring a certified copy of an out-of-state
decree to an Ohio court to be filed. Once filed, the Act requires that the
decree be given full recognition and effect until modified. 1 This same section
also provides a custodial parent with a valid out-of-state custody decree
which is protected by Ohio laws, provided the decree is properly filed.
Legislation is pending in the United States House of Representatives
which if passed would require that all states give full faith and credit to cus-
"W'dliams v. Williams, 44 Ohio St. 2d 28, 336 N.E.2d 426 (1975). See In re Morell, 118
Ohio App. 237, 186 N.E.2d 761 (1962); In re Wolfe, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 274, 187 N.E.2d
658 (Juv. Ct., Preble Cty. 1962) (where the Ohio courts gave full faith and credit to valid
out of state custody decrees).
45 Omo REv. CODE AN. § 3109.22 (Page Supp. 1977).
,'Old. § 3109.23.
41 Id. 9 3109.30(A). This section does not require personal jurisdiction.
" Id.
4Id. § 3109.30(B). Ohio courts are also bound by statute to give full force and effect to for-
eign adoption decrees. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.15 (Page Supp. 1977).
90 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIcTIoN Acr, § 13.
01 OuO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.32 (Page Supp. 1977).
[VOL. 12:1
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tody decrees until modified by the court in the state where they were issued."2
The house bill was proposed by Representative Moss on April 29, 1977,
and is currently pending in the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and Government Relations. This bill would provide
a remedy to persons in states who have not adopted the U.C.C.J.A. It would
also eliminate the opportunities for illegal child snatching or forum shopping
to a jurisdiction which does not require that full faith and credit be given
to child custody decrees of sister states.
JUIUSDICTION
The U.C.C.J.A. has created a two-pronged analysis of child custody
jurisdiction. The first prong determines if a court has jurisdiction to hear
the custody case; the second prong determines whether the court should exer-
cise that jurisdiction."3 In making the determination on the first prong, the
court applies four tests to the fact situation." If it answers affirmatively to
any one of the four tests, it has jurisdiction. In drafting this first prong, the
Ohio legislature has changed the operative language from that found in the
U.C.C.J.A.55 By doing so, the first prong could be interpreted to mean that
a court should apply the four tests to determine if they should exercise juris-
diction rather than if they have obtained jurisdiction. However, upon ex-
amining the Ohio act in its entirety, the specific title to the section, "Pre-
requisites to Jurisdiction"56 and the fact that the language of the tests and
subsequent sections follow the Uniform Act, it appears that the change
in language was not intended to change the thrust and intent of the Act.
Once jurisdiction has been conferred through these tests, the court must
then look to the second prong to determine if it should exercise that juris-
diction. Reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction include pendency of
52 Proposed H.R. 6786, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. (Proposed April 29, 1977). "A Bill to
exercise the power of Congress under Article IV of the Constitution to declare the effect
of certain State judicial proceedings respecting custody of children."
5$ UNIFORM CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, § 3(a).
5
'[d. § 3(a)(l)-(4).
55Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.22(A) (Page Supp. 1977). The section is entitled "Juris-
diction to determine custody of a child" and states that, "No court of this state having
jurisdiction to determine the custody of a child shall exercise that jurisdiction unless one of
the following applies ...." However, the U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a) states that, "A court of this
state which is competent to decide custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification decree if...."
It appears that both provisions refer to a court which has jurisdiction to hear child cus-
tody cases. The U.C.C.J.A. requires the application of the four tests to determine whether
a court which has jurisdiction over custody matters will have jurisdiction in the specific cus-
tody proceedings. On the other hand, the Ohio statutory language seems to use the applica-
tion of the tests to determine if the jurisdiction should be exercised.
86 0mo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.22(A) (Page Supp. 1977).
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proceedings in another state,5 ' forum non conveniens,58 or improperly ob-
tained custody.59 Denying jurisdiction in these cases serves the purpose and
spirit of the Act by preventing forum shopping, eliminating conflicts be-
tween state courts, and insuring that a custody determination will be made
by the court that can best meet the interests of the child."'
The focal point in the jurisdictional section of Ohio's U.C.C.J.A. is
the section entitled "Prerequisites to Jurisdiction"'" which provides Ohio
courts with the four tests to be used to ascertain if the court has jurisdiction.
In Ohio, the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction over matters
of divorce.62 Once the court of common pleas has obtained jurisdiction over
a divorce proceeding, it has an incidental power to award custody of minor
children. 8 The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the court of common
pleas has a duty to determine the care, custody and control of minor children
of the marriage in an action for divorce* and failure to do so will result in
reversible error.65 It is generally held that if the court does not grant the
divorce, it no longer has jurisdiction to make a decree of custody. 6 A
growing number of courts have held that if the court does not grant a
divorce, but the parties are living separately and apart, the court retains its
jurisdiction to determine child custody. 7 When the jurisdiction of the com-
mon pleas court terminates, the court should certify the issue of custody to
the juvenile court.6 8
In order for a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain custody jurisdic-
tion, it must be able to answer affirmatively to one of the four statutory
tests. 9 The first test to be applied by the Ohio court is whether Ohio is the
011d. § 3109.24.
" Id. § 3109.25.
59Id. § 3109.26.
Old. § 3109.04.
61 Id. § 3109.22.
62 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page Supp. 1972) (formerly § 3105.21, repealed July
1, 1977). See Omo Civ. R. 75 (D) (Page Supp. 1977).
63 Black v. Black, 110 Ohio St. 392, 144 N.E. 268 (1924); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 15 Ohio St.
427 (1864).
" Rolls v. Rolls, 9 Ohio St. 2d 59, 223 N.E.2d 604 (1967); Bower v. Bower, 90 Ohio St. 172,
106 N.E. 969 (1914); McVay v. McVay, 44 Ohio App. 2d 370, 338 N.E.2d 772 (1974).
45 Mierowitz v. Mierowitz, 71 N.E.2d 526 (Ct. of App., Mahoning Cty. 1946).
as Haynie v. Haynie, 169 Ohio St. 467, 159 N.E.2d 765 (1959).
67 Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.21 (B) (Page Supp. 1977) states: "Upon failure of proof
of the courses in the complaint, the court may make an order for disposition, care, and
maintenance of any dependent child of the marriage as is in the child's best interest and in
accordance with § 3109.04." See OHio Civ. R. 75(P); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1096 (1966).
68 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A),(C),(D) (Page Supp. 1977).
*9 id. § 3109.22(A).
[Vol. 12:1
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"home state"' of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding.'
To apply this test, the court must determine whether the child has been living
in the state for six months. If the child has been absent from the state be-
cause he has been removed by one claiming custody, the issue then becomes
whether Ohio was the child's home state prior to commencement of the
proceeding and whether a parent still lives in Ohio."2 This situation is most
commonly found in cases of child snatching where the child has been re-
moved from Ohio by the noncustodial parent in an effort by that parent
to gain custody elsewhere. If a child is less than six months old, the court
has jurisdiction if Ohio was the place of the child's birth.t It should be noted
that physical presence of the child in the jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to
determine home state. On the other hand, physical presence alone is gen-
erally not sufficient for a court to obtain and exercise jurisdiction."
This statutory provision should be read in conjunction with Ohio Re-
vised Code section 3109.26 which expressly refers to cases of child snatch-
ing. 5 The section states that although a child is in Ohio, the court may de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction when the petitioner has wrongfully taken the
child from the custodial parent or has acted in violation of a valid custody
decree."'
The "home state" test under the U.C.C.J.A. has been applied in several
jurisdictions. The Oregon Supreme Court was faced with the issue in Settle
v. Settle"' where both husband and wife originally resided in Indiana. The
wife took the children to Oregon, then returned to Indiana to file for divorce
and an award of temporary custody. After obtaining a temporary custody
decree, but prior to a divorce decree which granted custody to the husband,
the wife moved back to Oregon where she remained with the children. The
Oregon court held that because the children were living with a parent in
Oregon for more than six months prior to commencement of the action, it
was the home state of the children and had jurisdiction to modify the custody
TOld. § 3109.21(E). "Home state" is defined in the statute as:
the state in which the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months, and
in the case of a child less than six months old, the state in which the child lived from
birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of the
named persons are counted as part of the six month or other period.
1T ld. § 3109.22(A)(1).
T2 Id.
13Id. § 3109.21(E).
6 OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3109.22(C) (Page Supp. 1977).
Isid. § 3109.26(A) & (B).
I ld.
Ty 276 Ore. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976).
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decree."8 Similarly, the court of special appeals in Maryland in Howard v.
Gisht held that since a child had been living in Maryland for over eleven
months with the custodial parent, Maryland was the home state of the child
and therefore had jurisdiction to modify a custody decree which had been
originally granted in another jurisdiction.
The second jurisdictional test, the maximum contacts type test, is used
to determine whether it is in the best interest of the child for the court to
assume jurisdiction because the child and at least one of the parents have
significant connection with the state."0 This test provides the court with more
flexibility than the home state test. The court is asked to ascertain if the
state has access to substantial evidence "concerning the child's present, or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships."81 This section
was enacted to cover situations where a child does not have a "home state."
As an alternative to the home state test, if the court after examining all
evidence finds that maximum contacts with the child may exist in a state
which may not be the child's home state, that state may exercise jurisdic-
tion. 2 The commissioner's comments stress that this section of the Act must
be interpreted in the spirit of the legislation with the best interests of the
child as the prominent concern in determining jurisdiction.8 The court in
Settle v. Settle also applied this test and determined that the children no
longer had significant contact with the state which issued the custody decree
and that it had "optimum access to relevant evidence about the child and
the family;" thus it had obtained jurisdiction to modify the custody decree."
The third jurisdictional test grants jurisdiction to a court if a child is
physically present in the state and has been abandoned, threatened, mis-
treated, or abused, and because of the emergency situation the court must
protect the child." This section requires physical presence in the state and
19 Id.
T9 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d 1280 (1977). After the death of the mother, the custodial
parent, the Maryland court was asked to determine custody between the stepfather who was
living in Maryland with the child, and the natural father living out of state in the divorce-
granting jurisdiction. The court held Maryland to be the home state of the child even though
the divorce was granted out of state. The court also held that the court may not exercise
its jurisdiction if upon obtaining information from the out-of-state court it finds that it
is not the appropriate forum.
60 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.22(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1977).
a Id.
82 UNIORM Cm CUSTODY JURISDICTION Acr, § 3 Comment.
83 Id.
" 276 Ore. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976).
05 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.22(A) & (B) (Page Supp. 1977).
(Vol. 12:1
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abandonment or emergency situations and gives the court "parens patriae
jurisdiction." '
The final test grants jurisdiction to the Ohio court if no other state
court can meet one of the first three tests, or if another state has declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that Ohio is the more appropriate
forum. 7
After applying the first prong of the test and determining that the
court has jurisdiction, the burden remains on the court to determine whether
that jurisdiction should be exercised. This second prong presents issues which
should cause the court to reexamine the purposes of the Act and make its
determination accordingly.
Issues relating to whether a court should exercise jurisdiction generally
center around two broad areas. The first situation involves a parent who
has brought the child from out of state and asks the in-state court for an
initial decree. The court must determine that it is the best forum to hear
the case before exercising jurisdiction. The second situation arises
when a parent, generally the noncustodial parent, takes the child out of
the state and seeks to have the decree modified in his/her favor by the out-
of-state court. Several sections of the U.C.C.J.A. serve as guidelines for the
court when determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over the custody
dispute.
A court in Ohio shall not exercise its jurisdiction if there is another
custody proceeding pending in an out-of-state court with jurisdiction at the
time the custody petition is filed with the Ohio court.88 It may exercise juris-
diction of the out-of-state court stayed the proceeding because Ohio is a
more appropriate forum. 9
The statute places the burden on the Ohio court to make all possible
efforts to determine if there are proceedings pending out of state."' The court
must examine the pleadings and other records to ascertain if there are other
proceedings pending, and if it appears that such proceedings may exist, the
court shall make an inquiry with the out-of-state court. 1
Communication and cooperation between state courts are essential. Once
an Ohio court determines that an out-of-state proceeding has been pending
86 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, § 3 Comment.
87 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.22(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1977).
SS d. § 3109.24(A).
8I d.$aid. § 3109.24(B).
" id.
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prior to the Ohio petition, it shall stay the proceeding. The court is then
required to communicate with the out-of-state court to determine which is
the appropriate forum to award custody. If the Ohio court awards custody
prior to becoming aware of the out-of-state proceedings, it shall report this
immediately to the out-of-state court. The Ohio Court also has the responsi-
bility of informing an out-of-state court of its custody proceedings when it
learns that the other court is planning to exercise its jurisdiction."2 This
section was drafted to prevent conflict and competition between state courts
and it is therefore incumbent upon the Ohio court to take an active role in
order to insure thorough communication with out-of-state courts.9"
When two courts have proceedings pending to determine the custody
of the same child, the statute provides guidelines to be used to determine
the inconvenient and the more appropriate forum.' The Ohio court has dis-
cretion to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if it determines that another court
is a more appropriate forum and Ohio is thus an inconvenient forum to de-
termine custody. 5 "A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or
other representative of the child."' ,
The statute provides the court with factors to be applied to determine
if it is an inconvenient forum and if it is in the best interests of the child to
have another court award custody. These factors are nonexclusive. They
include:
(1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his
family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more
readily available in another state;
(4) If the parties have agreed on another forum that is no less ap-
propriate.""
In applying these factors, a court may communicate with the out-of-state
"Id. § 3109.24(C).
93 Umsvoa CmLD CUSTODY JuRisDwcTIoN AcT, § 6 Comment. See Paltrow v. Paltrow, 37
Md. App. 191, 376 A.2d 1134 (1977).
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court to obtain pertinent information necessary to be used in the court's
determination of whether it is an inconvenient forum.""
If the Ohio court determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that
an out-of-state forum is the appropriate forum, it may either dismiss the
proceedings or stay them conditioned on prompt commencement of an action
in the other forum.9 The court may also require that the petitioner pay the
clerk of court costs of the proceedings, necessary travel expenses and the at-
torney's fees of the other party, or expenses of their witnesses.'" Upon deter-
mination that Ohio is an inconvenient forum and dismissal is required, the
Ohio court should communicate this information to the more appropriate
forum °01
Since the adoption of the U.C.C.J.A. in various states, courts have had
opportunities to apply these provisions to determine whether they should
exercise custody. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Howard v.
Gish0 ' held that although it was the home state of the child at the beginning
of the custody proceedings, it could refuse to exercise jurisdiction if it was
found to be an inconvenient forum. To aid its determination of appropriate
forum, the court sought information from the divorce and custody granting
state. 2
0
The Supreme Court of Washington recently applied the doctrine
of forum non conveniens when it was asked to modify an out-of-state decree.
Although the state legislature had not passed the U.C.C.J.A., the Washington
Supreme Court applied the principles of the Act in In re Marriage of
Dunkley. "' The court declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify a custody
decree because the decree was awarded in California and the California
court has continuing jurisdiction. In addition the California court decree
was entered after a long trial and that court would be a more appropriate
forum to fully ascertain if changed circumstances exist to require the court
to modify the custody award.108
If an out-of-state court determines that it is an inconvenient forum and
that Ohio is the more appropriate forum to determine custody, the out-of-




101 Id. § 3109.25(H).
102 Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d 1280 (1977).
I" Id.
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Ohio court. Once jurisdiction is obtained by the Ohio court, this should be
communicated to the out-of-state court.'
A court may also decline to exercise jurisdiction when it finds that the
petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully brought the child to Ohio
from out of state." 7 This section may be extremely helpful in cases of pa-
rental child snatching prior to an initial custody decree or when proceedings
are pending out of state. This type of situation is most common where
parents have separated and have not filed for divorce. Neither party has a
custody decree and their prior agreements are usually not legally binding.
Child snatching and other self help methods during this period leave the
parent who has possession of the child in a strong bargaining position and
the other parent with few legal remedies, especially where the parent with
the child has concealed his/her whereabouts.
The court may exercise jurisdiction if it is in the best interest of the
child, but generally should not exercise jurisdiction to modify a custody
decree when the noncustodial parent has taken the child from the custodial
parent in contradiction of the custody decree.' In appropriate cases, when
a court dismisses a petition, "it may charge petitioner with necessary travel
and other expenses, including attorney's fees incurred by the other parties
or their witnesses."1"
The application and interpretation of several sections together as done
by the above courts serve as an excellent example for the Ohio courts'
application of the U.C.C.J.A. The determination of when to exercise juris-
diction, more so than any other section of the act, demands that the court
interrelate the sections and make a determination in light of the purposes of
the U.C.C.J.A.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE U.C.C.J.A.
The U.C.C.J.A. requires that a court granting a custody decree comply
with a number of procedural safeguards. The procedural due process re-
quirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given before
a court can make a valid custody decree." Parties requiring notice and
104 Id. § 3109.25(I).
207 Id. § 3109.25(A). See A. DEMmTmR, LEGAL KIDNAPPING (1977). The author sensitizes
the reader to the critical issues of child snatching by describing her own experiences. Upon
separating from her husband, but prior to divorce, he took two of their children for a
visit and proceeded to kidnap them. One of the author's major problems was the lack of
legal mechanisms available to her to regain physical custody of her children.
log Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.26(B) (Page Supp. 1977).
"0 Id. § 3109.26(C).
120 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.23(A) (Page Supp. 1977). See Omo Cxv. R. 4, 4.2, 4.4,
4.6 (Page Supp. 1971).
[Vol. 12:1
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss1/9
Summer, 1978]
an opportunity to be heard include contestants, any parent whose parental
rights have not been terminated, and any person or agency who has physical
custody of the child." If one submits to the court's jurisdiction, notice is
not required."
If any of the abovementioned parties are living out of state, notice
should be given in accordance with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure"8 or
by one of the methods required by statute."' Methods of service to out-of-
state parties under the statute include either compliance with the law of the
jurisdiction where service is made" 5 or in a manner which the court deter-
mines will effectively notify the party, including service by publication.""
The commissioners in drafting the U.C.C.J.A. included service by
personal delivery"' and by any form of mail which requires a receipt." The
commissioners stressed that actual notice is preferred, but if not available
"notice in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice [is] sufficient
when a person who may perhaps conceal his whereabouts, cannot be
reached.""' 9 It is also stressed that notice by publication alone will generally
not meet the requirements and that courts should only use notice by publica-
tion in conjunction with other methods of notice.'
The statute requires that notice to an out-of-state party "shall be served,
mailed, delivered, or published at least twenty days before hearing in this
state.""' Proof of out-of-state service may be made by affidavit by the persons
receiving service,"' by compliance with the requirements in the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure,"' or if service by mail, with the procedural requirements
of the state where service is made."4 As stated in the Act, "proof may be a
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of deliverance to the
addressee."""
III OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.23(A) (Page Supp. 1977).
112Id. § 3109.23(E).
113 Omo Civ. R. 4.3, 4.5 (Page 1971).
114 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.23(B) (Page Supp. 1977).
2'5id. § 3109.23(B)(1).
1A Id. § 3109.23(B)(2).
I" UNiFoRM CHILD CUSTODY JiUsDIcnoN ACr, § 5(1).
"a Id. § 5(3).
I's Id. § 5 Comment.
120 Id.
121 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.23(C) (Page Supp. 1977).
222 Id. § 3109.23(D).
123 OHIO Civ. R. 4.3, 4.1(2) (Page Supp. 1971).
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Every party to the custody proceeding is required by statute to give
information under oath to the court. 2 ' The statute requires that the informa-
tion be provided either in the first pleading or in an affidavit attached thereto.
The statute states that the party "shall" give information, including the child's
present address, the child's addresses for the past five years, and the names
and present addresses of the persons with whom the child resided during the
past five years. 1 2 The party is also required to give the following information:
(1) Whether the party has participated as a party, witness, or in any
other capacity in any other litigation concerning the custody of
the same child in this or any state;
(2) Whether the party has information of any custody proceeding con-
cerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state;
(2) Whether the party knows of any person not a party to the proceed-
ings who has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody
or visitation rights with respect to the child. 2 8
If the court is informed of other custody proceedings or other pertinent
facts from the pleadings of the party, the court may require that the declarant
give further details under oath. 2 9 The party has a continuing duty to report
to the court any information of either in- or out-of-state proceedings relevant
to the custody proceeding."' The purpose for these mandatory requirements
is to insure that the court is provided with all information pertinent to the
custody determination as early as possible." A court must be able to obtain
and review this information when it seeks to determine if it has jurisdiction
and whether it should exercise that jurisdiction.'"
If the information received from the pleadings indicates that a party who
is necessary to the proceeding has not been included, such as a party with
physical custody or one who claims to have custody or visitation rights, the
court shall join the party to the proceeding."' The person joined should be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the statutory
requirements." This section was drafted to prevent relitigation. " ' An ex-
128 Id. § 3109.27(A).
127 Id.
1281d. § 3109.27(A)(1)-(3).
2291 d. § 3109.27(B).
180 ld. § 3109.27(C).
1'1 UNIPOMR CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, § 9 Comment.
12 Id.
183 Omo REv. CODE A"N. § 3109.28 (Page Supp. 1977).
134 Id. § 3109.23.
Ias UNM o M CHI.D CusToDY JuRIsDCnoN AcT, § 10 Comment.
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ample of a situation where a necessary party must be joined would be where
the custody dispute is between parents and a relative, perhaps a grandparent,
who lives out of state and claims a right to visitation. All claims should be
brought to the court at once and the court has the duty to insure that all in-
formation has been elicited and that all necessary parties are brought into
the litigation.""
Once a party has been joined into the litigation, the court may order that
the party make a personal appearance.'" If the party has physical custody of
the child, the court may order that both the party and the child appear before
it."8 If the party is out of state, the court, by complying with the out-of-state
notice requirements,"' may order that a party make a personal appearance.
The party's failure to appear "may result in a decision adverse to that party."' "
If "just and proper under the circumstances,"'' the court may require that
another party pay for the travel and other expenses necessary to enable the
out-of-state party and the child to make an appearance before the court. "2
Once a party has been notified or has submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court and has been given an opportunity to be heard in accordance with
statutory provisions, the custody determination is binding on all parties. The
decree "is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided as to the custody
determination made, unless and until that determination is modified pursu-
ant to law."'
The issues of continuing jurisdiction of the decree rendering court and
jurisdiction to modify a decree have consistently been raised in child custody
cases. Continuing jurisdiction has been statutorily defined in Ohio as follows:
In any case where a court of common pleas, or other court having
jurisdiction, has made an award of custody or an order for support, or
both, of minor children, the jurisdiction of such court shall not abate
upon the death of the person awarded such custody but shall continue
for all purposes during the minority of such children."
The continuing jurisdiction of a decree granting court can be invoked either
188 Id.
187 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.29(A) (Page Supp. 1977).
lu ld.
1A Id. § 3109.23(B).
"
01 Id. § 3109.29(B).
1,' id. § 3109.29(C).
142 Id.
18 Id. § 3109.30(A).
1" Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.06 (Page 1972).
COMMENT
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by motion of the court" ' or by "motion filed in the original action, notice
which shall be served in the manner provided for service of process under
Rule 4 through Rule 4.6."1'" Ohio requires that all procedural due process
requirements be complied with when one invokes the continuing jurisdiction
of the court.
The Ohio courts in applying the concept of continuing jurisdiction have
generally held that if an Ohio court has awarded a child custody decree, it
retains jurisdiction to modify the decree under the concept of continuing
jurisdiction even if the custodial parent and the children have moved out of
state.' 7 A minority of Ohio courts has held that a court's continuing juris-
diction ends when the custodial parent and child move out of state.'
The U.C.C.J.A. has incorporated the common law concept of continu-
ing jurisdiction to modify custody decrees in the section entitled "Modification
of Foreign Decree."'' The section provides that an Ohio court shall not ob-
tain jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state decree as long as the out-of-state
court has complied with procedural requirements of the Act.'50 The Ohio
court may obtain jurisdiction to modify if it appears that the Ohio court
has jurisdiction, and (1) it appears that the decree rendering court no longer
has jurisdiction under procedural prerequisites substantially similar to those
of the Act, or (2) the court has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify."5
This section was drafted by the Commission to "achieve greater stability
of custody arrangements and avoid forum shopping.""
An Ohio court may then be authorized to modify an out-of-state decree
under the previous section. 5 It may also be authorized to modify if re-
quired in the best interest of the child when the noncustodial parent has
improperly removed the child to Ohio and has asked to have the out-of-state
'45 d.
146 OHIO Crv. R. 75(I) (Page Supp. 1977). See Omo Crv. R. 4-4.6, which include process of
serving summons, methods of service, who may be served, out-of-state service, service by
publication, and service requested.
'47Von Divort v. Von Divort, 165 Ohio St. 2d 141, 134 N.E.2d 715 (1956); Murck v.
Murck, 47 Ohio App. 2d 292, 353 N.E.2d 917 (1976); Wallace v. Wallace, 49 Ohio App.
2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1369 (1974). In all three cases the custodial parent and child moved
out of Ohio. The noncustodial parent motioned the Ohio court to modify the custody
decree. The courts held that they retained continuing jurisdiction to modify.
148 Heiney v. Heiney, 40 Ohio App. 2d 571, 321 N.E.2d 611 (1973).
149 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.31 (Page Supp. 1977).
150 1d. § 3109.31(A).
151 Id.
252 UN ORM CHLD CUSTODY JumrsDiiCIoN Act, § 14 Comment.
'58 Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 3109.3 1(B) (Page Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 12:1
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decree modified.15 ' Once the Ohio court determines that it should exercise
jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state decree, the statute requires that the
court has the burden of considering all transcripts and records used by the
custody granting court in the original proceeding.155
A recent case decided under the U.C.C.J.A. exemplifies the issues of
continuing jurisdiction and jurisdiction to modify. The California Court of
Appeals in Miller v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 5" held that it
would not exercise its jurisdiction to modify an Australian custody decree
when the custodial parent violated the decree and moved with the children
to California without notifying anyone. It relied on the concept of continuing
jurisdiction which requires that the Australian court would be the appropri-
ate forum to modify the decree.
Prior to enactment of the U.C.C.J.A., Ohio had adopted a statute which
provides guidelines for courts in determining or modifying a custody de-
cree. 5 Today this section is to be read in accordance with the provisions of
Ohio's U.C.C.J.A. These prior statutory guidelines provide that a court shall
not modify a prior decree unless there has been a change of circumstances
of the custodial parent or child or it would be in the best interest of the child
to modify the custody decree. 8
In determining whether circumstances have changed since the original
award of custody, the statute expressly states that the custodial parent should
not be changed unless:
(1) The custodian agrees to a change in custody.
(2) The child, with the consent of the custodian, has been integrated
into the family of the person seeking custody.
(3) The child's present environment endangers significantly his physi-
cal health or his mental, moral, or emotional development and
the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is out-
weighed by the advantages of such change to the child. 5'
154 Id. § 3109.26. Although this section may give Ohio courts authority to modify an out-
of-state decree in a child snatching situation, this is the exception to the rule. Such
authority should be exercised in emergency situations and never in a way that would be
contrary to the purposes of the Act. The thrust of the section, which is to avoid modifying
an out-of-state decree when the petitioner has improperly taken or restrained the child,
should be kept in mind.
255 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.31(B) & 3109.36(B) (Page Supp. 1977).
258 69 Cal. App. 3d 191, 138 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1977).
157 Ouso REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1977). See Omo Clv. R. 75(D) (Page
Supp. 1977) and proposed Amendment 75(D) (Baldwins 1978).
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The best interest of the child is of paramount importance when the
court is determining whether to award custody or modify a decree.' The
statute provides the courts with factors which it should consider in addition
to all other relevant factors when determining the best interests of the child:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents regarding his custody;
(2) The wishes of the child regarding his custody if he is eleven years
of age or older;
(3) The child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, sib-
lings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interests;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
(5) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
situation."'
The responsibility of a court in either awarding or modifying custody
extends to the very essence of the family. To insure that a court makes a
determination in the best interest of the child, the court must assume its
burden to investigate all relevant factors. Custody awards should be made to
promote the purposes underlying the U.C.C.J.A.'
The Ohio U.C.C.J.A. requires that certain records be kept by the courts.
A certified copy of an out-of-state custody decree may be filed with the clerk
of any Ohio court which renders custody decrees." 3 Once an out-of-state
decree has been filed in Ohio, it has the same effect as a similar decree ren-
dered in Ohio' and one who violates the decree may be required to pay for
necessary expenses, including travel and witness expenses, and attorney fees
incurred by the party entitled to custody.'
The Act imposes several duties upon the clerk of courts. After a court
renders a custody decree, the clerk "shall maintain a registry."'66 This registry
160 Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 83, 346 N.E.2d 286 (1976). In determining the best
interests of the child, the Ohio Supreme Court construed the conflict between Omo Civ. R.
75(P) which requires that before custody is granted to a relative both parents must be
found to be unfit and Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1977), which only
discusses the best interest of the child. The court held that the statute takes precedence
and the court must only find that granting custody to one other than a parent be in the
best interests of the child, and not that both parents are unfiit.
Is' Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C)(I)-(5) (Page Supp. 1977). See 1. GoLwsmn,
BEYOND THE Basr IrNrrEEgs OF ThE CHmaD (1973), which stresses a child's need for con-
tinuity in relationships.
162 See note 11 supra.
16 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.32(A) (Page Supp. 1977).
I "Id.
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is often referred to as a child custody registry. The clerk shall enter the follow-
ing into the registry:
(1) Certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for
filing;
(2) Communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in
other states;
(3) Communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a
court of another state;
(4) Other communications or documents concerning custody pro-
ceedings in another state that may affect the jurisdiction of a court
of this state or the disposition to be made by it in a custody pro-
ceeding.'
Upon the request of an out-of-state court, or the request of any person with
a legitimate interest or who is affected by the custody decree, the clerk of
courts shall send them a certified copy of the decree."0 8
Every Ohio court is required to preserve the pleadings and records of
all custody proceedings until the child is eighteen years old.' If an out-of-
state court makes a request, the Ohio court shall forward certified copies of
the abovementioned documents. " In addition, an Ohio state court that has
a custody suit pending shall request a certified copy of the record and tran-
scripts from the out-of-state court that previously awarded custody.""1
In the spirit of cooperation between state courts, the Act enables an
Ohio court to request that an out-of-state court conduct an ancillary hearing
to adduce evidence or conduct studies for use in the Ohio custody proceed-
ing." This provision also requires that if requested by an out-of-state court,
the Ohio court is required to conduct hearings or studies for use in the out-
of-state proceeding. " Costs of such services may be assessed against the
parties or if necessary, from the county treasury and taxed as costs of the
case." These hearings insure that a state which has exercised jurisdiction
over a custody proceeding will be able to obtain all pertinent records and
history from a state which has minimum contacts with the parties or the child.
267 Id.
168ld. § 3109.33(B).
169Id. § 3109.36(A). Documents under this section include pleadings, orders, decrees, and
any record made of the court's hearings, social studies, and other pertinent documents.
1710 d.
'171ld. § 3109.36(B).
2 72 ld. § 3109.34(A).
1731d. § 3109.35(A).
17' Id. § 3109.34(A).
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By gathering all available facts before the hearing, the court will be better
able to make a final determination and avoid relitigation.
An Ohio court is also authorized to request that an out-of-state court
order a necessary party, with or without the child, to the Ohio proceeding.
Necessary travel and other expenses may be assessed against another party
or will be "otherwise paid."' The court may also require that a deposition
or direct testimony of the out-of-state party be taken.' Reciprocal pro-
cedures provide that the Ohio court, upon request of an out-of-state court,
should enable a party to give voluntary testimony to be used by that out-of-
state court." These sections of the Act were designed to "fill the partial
vacuum which inevitably exists in cases involving 'interstate custody' since
part of the essential information about the child and his relationships to the
other persons is always in another state."' 8
CONCLUSION
Ohio's adoption of the U.C.C.J.A. offers greater stability and con-
sistency to child custody litigants. The Act provides the court with proceed-
ings and tests which will enable it to limit the exercise of jurisdiction to cases
where it is the most appropriate forum. Cooperation and communication
between state courts will enable them to reach the goal of limiting the number
of courts able to obtain jurisdiction.
Areas which may stiff be troublesome include the child snatching of
children before a custody decree has been granted and child snatching into
a jurisdiction which has not enacted the U.C.C.J.A. Remedies under the Act
are limited, especially if one takes the child into a jurisdiction that doesn't
recognize the U.C.C.J.A.
Under federal law,' the crime of kidnapping cannot be charged if the
person taking the child is the parent. Federal legislation is pending to amend
the federal kidnapping law. 80 If passed, the legislation would remove the
provision which makes an exemption for kidnapping of children by their
parent and make child snatching a federal crime. The legislation has been
ITS Id. § 3109.34(B).
1Id.
ITTId. § 3109.34(B).
17 8 UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIcTION AcT, § 18 Comment.
179 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. V 1975). This law, entitled the Lindbergh Act, includes
elements and punishment for federal kidnapping. It expressly excludes the case of kidnapping
of a minor child by a parent.
0so Proposed H.R. 762, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. (proposed January 4, 1977). "To amend
title 18, United States Code, to provide that any parent who kidnaps his minor child shall
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criticized by the American Bar Association."" One attorney has criticized
the legislation because it "would make criminals out of loving parents. 182
The parents may be loving and have good motives, but child snatching has
a detrimental effect on the children and needs to be eliminated. If the federal
legislation is defeated, it will be up to the states to provide for adequate means
to prevent child snatching. In an effort to make child snatching a punishable
crime, several states have already enacted statutes which make it a crime for
a parent to kidnap his/her own child.188
The U.C.C.J.A. may not alleviate all child snatching but if applied in
the spirit of the drafters, it will prevent the wrongdoer from obtaining a cus-
tody decree thereby precluding the parent from profiting from his action. As
more states enact the U.C.C.J.A., parents will find fewer places to run and
more courts with uniform procedures, thus eliminating finding a sympathetic
ear. Hopefully in the future parents will refrain from self help remedies to
child custody and will seek the court's jurisdiction and guidance for orderly
and fair custody determinations.
EVELYN LEONARD KosicKi
181 Moving to Stop Child Snatching, supra note 9, at 85.
182 Id.
183 OIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975). The Ohio legislature has enacted a statute
which makes child stealing a crime. One violating the child stealing statute is guilty of a
felony in the second degree. The statute provides for an affirmative defense if "the actor
reasonably believed that his conduct was necessary to preserve the child's health or welfare."
Id. § 2905.04(B). The statute also provides that if the child is taken by the natural, adopted
or step parent, but one not entitled to custody, the offense is a first degree misdemeanor, but if
the child is removed from the state, the offender is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Id. §
2905.04(C). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-58 (West Supp. 1976). California has en-
acted one of the strictest child snatching statutes. This statute provides that "anyone who
abducts a minor child with intent to detain or conceal such child from parent, guardian, or
person having legal charge" will be fined up to $10,000.00 and imprisoned up to ten years.
The statute also makes it a crime for one to conceal a child from one with visitation or
partial custody rights.
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